Elias Melky
“The loudest voice against fraud in the room
turned out to be the one worth investigating.”
This review was initiated by InvescoTel, Whisl, Fjord Telecom, Cornwall Tele, Asterope Telecom and others in collaboration with a coalition of telecom industry veterans and international carriers who independently experienced similar patterns — and refused to be silenced when attempts were made to suppress their accounts through intimidation and pressure.
Known Profile
Chairman & CEO of ICS International Carrier Services LLC, registered at a virtual mailbox in Hollywood, Florida. Filed in Florida in September 2021 (not 2017 as sometimes claimed). Previously operated under GemGroup, an earlier venture in the telecom space. Claims over 15 years in international telecommunications with operations across five continents. The company presents itself as a wholesale voice carrier providing termination services to fixed and mobile operators worldwide. Speaks seven languages — English, Russian, French, Greek, Arabic, Armenian, and Spanish. Holds an MBA from Atlantic International University.
Notably positions himself as a vocal anti-fraud activist in the telecom industry — frequently posting about fraud prevention, calling out bad actors, and warning carriers about dishonest practices. The irony of this public persona is not lost on those who have dealt with him privately.
The Anti-Fraud Activist Who Can’t See the Mirror
There’s a particular kind of audacity in someone who loudly calls out fraud in others while allegedly engaging in the very practices they condemn. Elias Melky has built a public persona as an industry watchdog — posting warnings about bad actors, flagging suspicious routes, positioning himself as a protector of the telecom ecosystem.
But those who’ve sat across the table from him tell a different story. The same person warning the industry about fraud is, according to multiple independent sources, leaving a trail of unpaid invoices, broken commitments, and intimidated partners across multiple countries.
It’s a pattern as old as fraud itself: point the finger loudly enough at everyone else, and nobody thinks to look at you. Until they do.
“He’d post about fraud on LinkedIn in the morning, and by afternoon we’d be chasing the same guy for six months of unpaid invoices. You can’t make this stuff up.”
“Crypto Adoption Through the Eyes of Industry Veterans”
Elias Melky appears on the Zeebu YouTube channel — a crypto-telecom project that has since blown up as a major industry scam. Here he is, the self-proclaimed anti-fraud activist, sitting down to publicly promote and endorse a fraudulent cryptocurrency scheme targeting the very telecom industry he claims to protect. The interview is still up. The irony speaks for itself.
“Leading Male Telco Professional” — Award Filmed by His Own Brother
Elias Melky wins an “anti-fraud awareness” award at an industry event. The video was filmed and uploaded by his own brother via the MoreThan160 channel. A carefully staged moment of industry credibility — an award for anti-fraud excellence, for the person multiple carriers now describe as the biggest fraud in the room. When the applause fades, the unpaid invoices remain.
Breaking: The $500 Million Connection
Bankai Group → Zeebu → Elias Melki
The video above isn’t just embarrassing — it’s evidence of proximity to one of the largest telecom fraud cases in history.
Zeebu — the crypto platform Elias Melky publicly promoted — was created and funded by Bankai Group, the telecom conglomerate owned by Bankim Brahmbhatt. In August 2025, Bankai Group filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after being accused of a “breathtaking” $500 million fraud against BlackRock (via HPS Investment Partners) and BNP Paribas.
The scheme: Bankai’s subsidiaries Broadband Telecom and Bridgevoice fabricated customer invoices, forged email domains to impersonate legitimate telecom clients, and used these fictitious receivables as collateral to secure half a billion dollars in loans. Every customer email used to verify invoices over two years was fraudulent. The US Attorney’s Office in Brooklyn is investigating. Brahmbhatt is believed to have fled to India.
Here’s where it connects: Bankai Ventures (Bankai Group’s investment arm) led Zeebu’s $25 million funding round. Zeebu’s founder Raj Brahmbhatt is a relative of Bankim Brahmbhatt. And Zeebu’s “strategic partners”? Broadband Telecom and Bridgevoice — the exact same shell companies used to defraud BlackRock.
Industry analysts now describe Zeebu as a potential vehicle for laundering funds from the Bankai fraud — a crypto layer built on top of fabricated telecom transactions, designed to move money through blockchain where it becomes harder to trace.
And there sits Elias Melky — on camera, on the Zeebu YouTube channel, lending his face and credibility to the operation. The same person who positions himself as the telecom industry’s anti-fraud champion was publicly promoting a project now linked to what Bloomberg calls a “breathtaking” half-billion-dollar fraud.
Was he a knowing participant? A useful face for legitimacy? The investigation continues. But the video evidence is public, the connections are documented, and the questions demand answers.
Confirmed: Florida Attorney General
Investigating Elias Melky & ICS
This is no longer just an industry dispute. It is now a state-level law enforcement matter.
We have received confirmation from the Florida Attorney General’s Office that an investigation into Elias Melky and ICS International Carrier Services LLC is already underway. The investigation was triggered by traceback complaints filed earlier in 2026 related to fraudulent scam calls transmitted through ICS’s network into the US telephone system.
The complaints specifically involve calls impersonating major US banks and e-commerce platforms — a category of fraud that causes direct financial harm to American consumers and is aggressively pursued by both state and federal authorities under consumer protection and wire fraud statutes.
These tracebacks confirm what former employees already disclosed on this page: that ICS was knowingly carrying fraudulent traffic, including routes used by scam call centers and operations engaged in identity fraud, vishing, and financial impersonation schemes.
The fact that tracebacks led directly back to ICS means the call paths are documented, the CDRs exist, and the evidence chain connects ICS to the origination of illegal robocall traffic targeting American consumers.
What this means: The Florida Attorney General’s Office does not open investigations lightly. Traceback-initiated complaints that reach the AG level indicate a pattern of violations, not isolated incidents. This is consistent with what carriers, former employees, and industry sources have independently reported.
Combined with the Bankai/Zeebu connection, the CC route allegations, the SMS fraud operation, and the trail of unpaid carrier debts — the legal walls are closing in. The anti-fraud activist is now the subject of a fraud investigation.
US Sanctions Violations: Iran & Cuba Voice Routes
Crypto Payments to Sanctioned Entities
This may be the most serious allegation yet. According to information now in the hands of the Florida Attorney General’s Office, ICS International Carrier Services — a US-registered company — was actively carrying voice traffic to and from Iran and Cuba, two countries under comprehensive US sanctions.
Worse still: payments to Iranian suppliers were allegedly made in cryptocurrency — a method specifically designed to circumvent banking restrictions and sanctions enforcement. A US-registered LLC making crypto payments to entities in a sanctioned country is not a gray area — it is a potential federal crime under:
• IEEPA — International Emergency Economic Powers Act
• OFAC Sanctions — Office of Foreign Assets Control (US Treasury)
• Money Laundering Statutes — 18 U.S.C. § 1956, 1957
• Material Support — Providing services to sanctioned regimes
The evidence is not speculative. Call Detail Records (CDRs) documenting the Iran and Cuba traffic have been shared directly with the Florida Attorney General’s Office by former employees — some of whom have been indicted in India in connection with related operations and are now cooperating with investigators.
The CDRs show traffic routes, timestamps, durations, and termination points — creating an evidence chain that connects a Florida-registered US company to direct commerce with sanctioned nations, paid for in untraceable cryptocurrency.
What this means: If confirmed, this elevates the investigation from state-level consumer fraud to federal sanctions violations and money laundering — crimes that carry penalties of up to 20 years in federal prison and $1 million per violation under IEEPA. OFAC sanctions violations are enforced by the US Treasury, the Department of Justice, and the FBI. This is no longer just about unpaid carrier invoices.
The anti-fraud activist. The $500M Bankai connection. The scam call center routes. The fraudulent SMS operation. The Florida AG investigation. And now — sanctions evasion and crypto money laundering involving Iran and Cuba. Each layer peeled back reveals something worse underneath.
2025: When the Pieces Came Together
For years, individual carriers dealt with their experiences in isolation — each thinking they were the only ones. That changed in 2025.
When his ex-wife and former business partner left the company, things that had been carefully kept behind closed doors began to surface. Information that was previously compartmentalized started connecting. People who had been afraid to speak began reaching out to each other.
What emerged was not a series of isolated disputes — it was a systematic pattern spanning years and continents. The departure of his closest associate became the catalyst that turned private suspicions into a shared understanding across the industry.
“Once she left, people started talking. It was like a dam broke. Suddenly everyone realized they had the same story, the same broken promises, the same threats when they tried to collect.”
Recent Developments
The pattern continues into 2026. Carriers report debts that are now 6+ months overdue — met with nothing but empty promises or complete silence.
Most recently, ICS reportedly dropped its relationship with Digitalk, a known carrier in the industry, leaving behind a significant outstanding debt. Digitalk, which has unique visibility into ICS operations, traffic patterns, and financial dealings through their platform, has so far declined to disclose the full scope publicly, but industry sources confirm the debt is substantial.
This is not a historical problem. This is happening right now.
The Wall of Debt
Companies and carriers who have come forward
confirm Elias Melki and ICS owe them money
AND COUNTING
Ekaterina Reinaldo Barreiro — former employee whose salary was not paid for an extended period.
Public Registration Details
⚠ SITE SURVEY CONFIRMED: This is a virtual mailbox, not a real office. Over 1,000 companies are registered at the same address. ICS has no physical presence here.
Hollywood, FL 33024
✖ VIRTUAL MAILBOX — NOT A REAL OFFICE
Florida Division of Corporations — Official Filing
Source: Florida Sunbiz — Document #L21000404318
Hollywood, FL 33024
✖ VIRTUAL MAILBOX ($99/mo via Opus VO)
Yerevan, Armenia 0012
✖ OFFICE SHUT DOWN
Other Entities & Ongoing Verification
ICS International Carrier Services LLC may not be the full picture. Sources indicate that in recent years, additional business entities have been operating in the telecom space — not under Melki’s name directly, but directly linked to him through documentation, shared infrastructure, and overlapping operations.
We are currently verifying this information with the Florida Department of State and the IRS. Corporate filings, beneficial ownership records, and tax documentation are being reviewed. As soon as these details are confirmed, they will be published here.
The question is simple: how many entities are involved, and why were they kept separate?
Current Whereabouts: Unknown
Despite being registered in Hollywood, Florida, a site survey of the address at 7777 Davie Road Ext, Ste 302B confirms it is nothing more than a virtual mailbox service — a storefront shared by over 1,000+ other registered companies. ICS International Carrier Services has no physical office, no signage, no employees, and no real presence at this location.
So where is Elias Melky actually based?
His Yerevan, Armenia office has been shut down. His India back office has been shut down, all staff terminated. His Florida address is a mailbox.
Sources offer conflicting accounts: some say he is currently in Beirut, Lebanon (his birthplace), others believe he remains in Yerevan, Armenia. His actual location is under active investigation and has not been independently confirmed.
A CEO who claims to run a legitimate international telecom company — with no real office, no verifiable location, and every back office shut down. At what point does this stop looking like a business and start looking like someone who doesn’t want to be found?
The 4-Year Registration Gap & Identity Games
ICS International Carrier Services claims to have been “founded in 2017” — this date appears on LinkedIn, industry profiles, and the WeProject.media interview. But Florida corporate records tell a different story: ICS was not registered until September 13, 2021 (Document #L21000404318).
That’s a four-year gap. From 2017 to 2021, Elias Melky was operating in the US telecom market, carrying voice traffic, signing carrier agreements, and collecting payments — without a registered US entity. What company name was on those contracts? What entity received those payments? Were carriers doing business with a company that didn’t legally exist?
The timing is also notable: the Florida LLC was filed in September 2021, and the Yerevan office at Ghazar Business Center was listed as the head office on the filing. So when ICS finally registered in the US, its actual headquarters was in Armenia — while its Florida address was a $99/month virtual mailbox.
The Name Games
Multiple inconsistencies in how Elias presents himself across platforms:
• Legal name: Elias Melky (per Florida Sunbiz filing)
• LinkedIn URL: linkedin.com/in/eliasmelki (different spelling)
• WeProject.media: Referred to as “Elis”
• YouTube award video: “Elias Melky”
• LinkedIn company page: “Elias M.” (initial only)
• Domains: eliasmelki.com AND eliasmelky.com (owns both spellings)
Using multiple name variations makes it harder to cross-reference corporate filings, court records, and industry databases. Whether intentional or not, the result is the same: fragmented digital identity that resists due diligence.
Ghost Offices: Virtual Everywhere
Every known ICS “office” is either virtual, shared, or shut down:
A company that claims to serve “many of the world’s largest fixed and mobile operators” across five continents — operating entirely from virtual mailboxes and shared office spaces, with every physical location now closed.
Credibility Farming
ICS has profiles on Dun & Bradstreet, ZoomInfo, SignalHire, and multiple business directories — all showing the Hollywood, FL virtual mailbox as a legitimate business address. A D&B profile means ICS applied for a DUNS number — typically used to establish business credit.
For carriers evaluating a new partner, these directory listings create an appearance of legitimacy: a US-registered company, a Florida address, a D&B profile, a professional LinkedIn page with 3,700+ followers. It’s the perfect setup for a carrier that wants to secure credit terms — and then not pay.
There is also a separate entity, ICS International Carrier Services GmbH, registered in Cologne, Germany (HRB 98438, founded June 2019) with different directors (Andreas Damek, Chung Son). No proven connection to Melky’s Florida LLC has been established — but the identical company name across jurisdictions raises questions about whether the German entity’s reputation is being leveraged to legitimize the Florida operation, or whether there are undisclosed connections between the two.
The Shadow Network: 18tele.com & the Hidden SMS Empire
While ICS International Carrier Services operates as the public face, sources have identified a parallel operation running from the shadows. The domain 18tele.com — a telecom entity with no public connection to Elias Melky — has been identified by multiple sources as his backdoor operation, allowing him to run traffic and business dealings outside the scrutiny that comes with the ICS brand.
Additional domains tied to this network include ics-voice.net and ics-sms.net — the latter being connected to an SMS operation that was abruptly shut down, leaving behind significant unpaid debts across the SMS wholesale market.
“The SMS side was never clean. It was spam, hijacked opt-ins, fraudulent sender IDs — the kind of traffic that no legitimate aggregator would touch. When it collapsed, he just walked away and left everyone holding the bill.”
According to this former employee, the SMS arm of the operation was primarily engaged in fraudulent SMS traffic — including bulk spam campaigns, messages sent using hijacked opt-in lists, spoofed sender IDs, and other practices that violate international telecommunications regulations and carrier acceptable use policies. When the operation became unsustainable, it was shut down overnight — debts unpaid, partners ghosted, evidence buried.
Routing Traffic for Scam Call Centers
A second former employee has come forward with an even more disturbing account. According to this source, a significant portion of the voice routes managed under the ICS umbrella were so-called “CC routes” — industry shorthand for routes specifically used by online scam call centers.
These operations typically involve tech support scams, fake government agency calls, cryptocurrency fraud, and romance/investment scam operations — all of which rely on cheap, untraceable voice termination that legitimate carriers refuse to provide.
The former employee states that these routes were knowingly provisioned and maintained, and that the high margins on CC traffic were a core revenue driver for the operation — not an oversight or an accident.
“We all knew what CC routes meant. Everyone in the office knew. The margins were insane compared to legitimate traffic. When I asked questions, I was told to mind my own business. That’s when I started looking for another job.”
Providing termination services to scam call centers is not a gray area — it is a direct enablement of organized fraud that causes real financial harm to victims worldwide. Regulatory bodies including the FCC, FTC, and international anti-fraud coalitions are actively pursuing carriers who facilitate this traffic.
The Hidden Offices: Yerevan & India
While ICS International Carrier Services is registered in Hollywood, Florida, the actual operations tell a different story. In a 2017 interview with Armenian media, Elias Melky revealed that he moved to Yerevan, Armenia in March 2017 — the same year ICS was registered in Florida — and built a back office there with 10+ employees, specifically hiring staff who speak English, Russian, and Armenian. The Yerevan office has since been shut down — following the same pattern as every other operation once it draws attention.
Born in Beirut, Lebanon, he previously lived 6 years in the USA and 8 years in the UAE before relocating to Armenia. He described Yerevan as “a safe platform for business development” — and notably observed that “women in Armenia are more hardworking.” The office photos confirm this: his Yerevan team was predominantly young women.
The Yerevan office location is significant: Armenia’s position at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and the CIS region — combined with staff fluent in Russian, Armenian, and English — makes it an ideal hub for managing the very traffic routes that former employees describe: CC routes serving scam call centers across those exact regions.
The India Back Office — Same City as Bankai
Beyond Armenia, ICS also maintained a back office operation in India — located in the same city as Bankai Group’s headquarters. This geographic overlap with the Brahmbhatt family’s base of operations raises further questions about the depth of the ICS–Bankai–Zeebu relationship.
The India office was recently shut down, with all staff terminated — a pattern consistent with Melki’s approach of closing operations and walking away when scrutiny intensifies. First the SMS arm. Then the Armenia office. Then the India office. Three operations, three shutdowns, zero explanations. The question is: what were these teams working on, and why does every office close when scrutiny begins?
“Life in Armenia is simple. There are many friendly, well-educated people here. Yerevan is a safe platform for business development.”
Connected Domains & Entities
Timeline of Events
When the Industry Starts Talking
In the wholesale voice world, reputation is currency. When multiple carriers across different continents independently raise the same concerns, it stops being a dispute and starts being a pattern.
Sources from several countries have come forward with strikingly similar accounts — involving financial obligations left unresolved, partnerships that ended with more questions than answers, and a business approach that some describe as leveraging pressure when leverage shouldn’t exist.
“We were told it would be handled quietly. When we pushed back, the tone changed completely. That’s when we realized we weren’t the only ones.”
“When we started asking other carriers in Europe, every single one had the same story. Same promises, same delays, same threats when you try to collect. At some point you have to ask — is this a business or a scheme?”
The Playbook
Multiple sources describe a pattern so consistent it appears rehearsed:
Reports Received From
Independent accounts from carriers in the following regions:
The Questions That Keep Coming Up
How does someone position themselves as an anti-fraud crusader while carriers across multiple continents report the same pattern of unpaid debts and intimidation tactics?
Why did the full picture only emerge in 2025 — after his closest business partner walked away?
Why were carriers who began comparing notes warned against going public? And what exactly required such aggressive efforts to keep things quiet?
These are the questions this page will answer. Not opinions — documented patterns, verified timelines, and the accounts of those who refused to stay silent.
International Legal Exposure
Every jurisdiction where Elias Melky faces potential legal consequences:
If your company is currently routing traffic through ICS International Carrier Services, you may be unknowingly participating in a network under active investigation by the Florida Attorney General and potentially federal authorities.
Check your vendor list now. Look for ICS, pro-ics.com, 18tele.com, ics-voice.net, or any route with unusually high margins and Armenian, Indian, or Florida NOC contacts.
If you discover active ICS routes, document your CDRs and contact report@eliasmelki.com or report directly to the Florida Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division.
Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition
Stop ICS. Recover your money. End the cycle.
While Elias Melki hides behind virtual mailboxes and ignores creditors, US bankruptcy law gives you the power to act. If ICS won’t pay its debts voluntarily, the court can force the issue.
What Happens When You File
JOIN US — IT COSTS YOU NOTHING
We are not asking any creditor for money. All filing fees and legal costs are covered by us. You simply join the petition as a creditor with your documented claim against ICS. Together, we force ICS into bankruptcy court, compel full asset disclosure, and recover what is owed to you.
Our legal fees come only after successful recovery of funds — as a percentage agreed upon with each creditor before enrolling into the legal action. If nothing is recovered, you owe us nothing. The percentage will be discussed and agreed upfront prior to any action being taken on your behalf against ICS and Elias Melki.
Ready to stop this scammer from damaging the market? Contact us:
bankruptcy@eliasmelki.comAll communications are strictly confidential.
Frequently Asked Questions
I Was Affected Too
If ICS International Carrier Services or Elias Melki owes your company money, add your name to the growing list of creditors. Your submission is confidential.
⚠ Due Diligence Advisory
If you are a carrier or telecom operator currently in negotiations with Elias Melki, Elias Melky, ICS International Carrier Services LLC, or any associated entity — thorough due diligence is strongly recommended before entering into any financial commitments or traffic agreements. Request references. Verify payment history. Ask other carriers. Check this page again before signing.
📨 Have a Similar Experience?
If you or your company have had dealings with Elias Melky (Elias Melki), ICS International Carrier Services, or GemGroup that follow the pattern described above, your account matters. Others have already come forward. This initiative is backed by a coalition of telecom industry partners. You are not alone.
report@eliasmelki.comAll correspondence is confidential. Anonymity guaranteed upon request.
🔔 Get Notified When New Evidence Drops
This investigation is active. Be the first to know when new sections are published.
This investigation is active and ongoing.
All claims are backed by public records, court filings, and confidential sources.
New information is being verified and added as it is confirmed.
Last updated: March 2026